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SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
law remedy is available to a plaintiff for alleged Rule 10b-13 violations.'90
The Warren court's conclusion that a private right of action is proper under
Rule 10b-13 results from a sound application of the Cort v. Ash factors.
Considering the close relationship of Rule 10b-13 to Rule 10b-6, the analy-
sis and result would apply by analogy to any Rule 10b-6 private actions.
While full resolution of the law of standing under Rule 10b-6 and Rule
10b-13 has yet to be completed, the Piper, Warren, and Empress decisions
provide guidance on the more important issues. First, the purchaser-seller
requirement appears to be applicable to Rule 10b-6 and 10b-13 private
actions. In light of the courts' focus on the statutory origins of Rule 10b-6,
and the emphasis on purchase and sale in the statute, the purchaser-seller
requirement's application seems inescapable.' 9 ' Rule 10b-13's similar sta-
tutory authority and the Warren court's analysis of the Rule's purpose and
legislative intent indicate a similar limitation on Rule 10b-13 private
plaintiffs.' 2 Second, the Piper opinion demonstrates that the present Su-
preme Court tends toward strict construction of the federal securities
laws.' 3 Only when an adequate state remedy for persons victimized by
manipulative activity does not exist' 4 and a private remedy is consistent
with the purpose and legislative intent are private actions permissible
under Rules 10b-6 and 10b-13.15
FRANK A. LAFALCE
V. PROXY SOLICITATION
Shareholder input into corporate decision making is manifested most
commonly by the casting of votes by proxy.' Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19342 and SEC Rule 14a - 93 attempt to safeguard share-
'" Id. The Warren court supported its conclusion that the implication of a private right
is appropriate under Rule 10b-13 by distinguishing Piper from Warren. In Piper, the Supreme
Court held that since Chris-Craft's complaint gave rise to a cause of action under common
law principles of interference with a prospective commercial advantage, Chris-Craft had
remedies available under state law. 430 U.S. at 40-41.
,' See text accompanying notes 123-150 supra.
992 433 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
"3 See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, Securities Regulation, 91 HARv. L. REV. 274
(1977).
"' See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 40-41 (appropriate to relegate plain-
tiffs to remedy created by state law).
"I See id. at 31-37 (purpose of Williams Act is to benefit shareholders; defeated tender
offerors have no standing to sue).
I See 2 L. Loss, SEcumrEs REGULA'ON 858-59, 868-69 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Loss].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Section 14(a) provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
. . . to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect to any security (other than an
exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title." Id.
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977). Rule 14a-9 provides in pertinent part:
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holder suffrage rights through the regulation of proxy solicitation. Prem-
ised upon the theory that shareholder voting can be meaningful only if
shareholders are given a complete explanation of the corporate action for
which proxy approval is solicited,4 these proxy solicitation provisions re-
quire a proxy solicitor to disclose facts necessary for an informed share-
holder voting decision.5 Solicitation of proxies by means of statements
which misstate or omit material facts thus violates the disclosure scheme
and is prohibited.' Plaintiffs may bring suit for such violations of the
disclosure scheme7 if there is a causal connection between the violation and
the injury to shareholders." The success of shareholder suits for violation
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in light of the circumstances
under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements
therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier
communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
Id. at § 240.14a-9(a).
See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934) (disclosure will prevent
frustration of stockholder voting rights); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934)
(shareholders must have adequate knowledge of corporate affairs).
- See H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (1934).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1977). Whether there has been a
misstatement of omission of a material fact is a mixed question of law and fact. TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976); see Note, Securities Law-Proxy State-
ments-Materiality Defined for Rule 14a-9- TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 28 B.
C. IND. & COM. L. Rv. 349, 360-61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Materiality Defined for Rule
14a-91.
Materiality is the most important factor in a proxy solicitation case because there is no
violation of proxy solicitation law unless a misstatement or omission is material. Comment,
Securities Regulation-Rule 14a-9-Defining Materiality-TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 1052, 1055-56 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Defining Materiality].
Furthermore, a strong showing of materiality indicates that a misstated or omitted fact would
have been considered important by shareholders and thus eases the burden of proving causa-
tion, another element of a proxy law suit. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
384-85 (1970); note 144 infra.
I The SEC has statutory authority to bring suit for violations of proxy solicitation law.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1976). Although there is no express provision for private actions for proxy
law violations, the Supreme Court has held that a right to such private actions may be
implied from the language of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
1 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1974). See generally
Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Causation and Liability]. Some authorities assert that, in addition to
showing materiality and.causation, a plaintiff in a proxy solicitation action must show that
the violation resulted from some culpability on the part of the solicitor. See Marsh & Ander-
sen, The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder and TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., in PLI, EIGrH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECUeRrTES
REGULATION 309, 334 (Mundheim, Fleischer, & Vandegrift eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Marsh & Andersen] (scienter should be required for 14a-9 prosecutions); Comment,
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of proxy solicitation provisions depends, therefore, on a showing that a
material fact has been misstated or omitted and that the misstatement or
omission is linked causally to the shareholder injury.' Since the inception
of the proxy solicitation provisions, the courts have struggled with the
concepts of materiality and causation.10 Only recently has the Supreme
Court established tests to be applied by the courts in determining whether
these prerequisites for a successful proxy solicitation suit have been satis-
fied."
A. Materiality
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,'2 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that a fact is material for proxy solicitation purposes if "there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it impor-
Shareholders and Informed Voting: How Much Information Do They Need?, 28 MERCER L.
REv. 725, 730 (1977) [hereinafter cited as How Much Information?] (plaintiff must show
omission resulted from solicitor's negligence); Comment, The Standard of Materiality in the
Context of the Proxy Solicitation Rules: TSC v. Northway, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 379, 384 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Standard of Materiality] (culpability required but courts have not
agreed on standard). The scienter requirement results from the similarity of proxy solicitation
suits to common law actions for deceit in which scienter is required. Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973). Furthermore, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976), requires scienter for violations of tender offer law, and proxy solicita-
tions are "functionally indistinguishable" from tender offers. Marsh & Andersen, supra at
334. Those courts that have addressed the issue of culpability in proxy solicitation cases tend
to favor a negligence standard because the proxy solicitation provisions focus on the import-
ance of information to shareholders rather than the solicitor. The solicitor's motive for decid-
ing whether to disclose information does not affect the importance of the information to
shareholders. Thus, the state of mind of the solicitor is irrelevant. Moreover, the tender offer
provisions proscribe manipulation and deception. A high standard of culpability is thus
necessary to insure that a solicitor's conduct falls within such narrow proscriptions. A culpa-
bility standard need not be as high, however, to effectuate the proxy solicitation provisions'
broad policy of insuring meaningful disclosure. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S. S.
Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299
(2d Cir. 1973). But see Ash y. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975)(test for proxy
sufficiency objective; no scienter required).
9 For a discussion of the necessary elements of a proxy solicitation law suit, see Note,
False and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 GA. L. REv. 162, 176-89 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as False and Misleading Proxy Statements]; How Much Information?, supra note 8, at 730;
The Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 382-91.
10 For a review of the evolution of the materiality and causation requirements, see
Materiality Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 352-64; Proxy Solicitation, 1976-1977
Securities Law Developments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 938, 938-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Proxy Solicitation]; The Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 379-404; 43 TENN. L.
REV. 716, 719-25 (1976).
" The Supreme Court established the test for materiality in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1977); see text accompanying notes 12-29 infra. The causation
test was announced in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); see text accompa-
nying notes 143-51 infra. The Supreme Court's tests for materiality and causation are broad
"verbal formulations" that offer little guidance for practitioners. Marsh & Andersen, supra
note 8, at 342-44. The tests must be interpreted in light of subsequent judicial application.
Id.
,2 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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tant in deciding how to vote."'" The TSC test represents an attempt on the
part of the Court to resolve the conflict among lower courts over the proper
standard to be applied in determining whether misstated or omitted facts
are material. 1 Lower courts had differed over the degree of significance a
reasonable shareholder must attribute to a fact before it can be considered
material. Some courts had held that a fact was material if it "might" be
considered significant by shareholders in deciding how to vote,' 5 while
others had held that a showing that the fact "would" cause the shareholder
to change his voting decision was required."6 The Supreme Court chose a
middle ground. The TSC test requires more than a showing that a fact
might be considered significant. The test does not require a showing that
a fact is so important that it would cause a shareholder to change his voting
decision, but only that a fact would be considered significant in the voting
decision. 7
The TSC court, however, did not resolve the question of the proper test
of materiality in all cases. Prior to TSC, courts had treated proxy state-
ment omissions and misstatements in a different fashion. The courts had
held that omission of facts did not violate the disclosure scheme even if
the facts were material unless disclosure of those facts was necessary to
make affirmative statements made in the proxy statement not false or
misleading." Such holdings accord with the language of Rule 14a-9.11 The
TSC test, however, does not cite necessity of disclosure to make affirmative
statements not false or misleading as a measure of materiality, nor does it
indicate whether misstatements and omissions are to be treated differ-
ently. 10 Although the TSC test, standing alone, indicates a new approach
to determining whether omisions are material, the Court's analysis reflects
prior decisions.
The only omission with which the TSC Court dealt related to a letter
," Id. at 449. The TSC Court arrived at its materiality test by balancing the need of
shareholders for full information against the possibility that solicitors would bury sharehold-
ers with trivial information if too low a standard of materiality were imposed. Materiality
Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 354; see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. at 448-49.
" Materiality Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 356-59; 43 TENN. L. REv. 716, 724-
25 (1976); see Proxy Solicitation, supra note 10, at 938-39.
" See, e.g., Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324,330 (7th Cir. 1975); General
Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1026 (1969).
" See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 771 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301-02 (2d Cir. 1973).
'7 See Materiality Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 356-59.
See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968);
Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 245 (D. Del. 1975); Ash v. Baker, 392 F. Supp.
368, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976).
" Rule 14a-9 prohibits the use of a proxy statement that "omits to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading." 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9 (1977).
0 The TSC Court purported to establish the same test for misstatements and omissions.
426 U.S. at 449.
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from TSC's investment banker."1 The TSC Industries' board of directors
planned to sell TSC to National Industries.22 TSC's investment banker
prepared a report on the desirability of making the sale and the report was
disclosed to TSC's shareholders.? After disclosure of the report, the invest-
ment banker sent a letter to the TSC board clarifying the hypothesis on
which the report had been based.2 The letter was not disclosed in TSC's
proxy statement soliciting approval of the sale and that omission was the
focus of the Supreme Court's inquiry.? In determining whether the omis-
sion was material, the Court examined the effect that the letter had on the
contents of the disclosed report."0 The Court found that the letter did not
affect the favorable tone of the report and that, therefore, omission of the
letter was immaterial. Despite the absence from the TSC materiality test
of any requirement that disclosure of omitted facts be necessary to make
affirmative statements not false or misleading, the Court's analysis of the
materiality of the omission of the banker's letter indicates that such a
requirement may still be viable.?
In two recent cases, the court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
has held that for an omission to be material, disclosure of omitted facts
must be necessary to make affirmative statements not false or misleading.
Shapiro v. Belmont Industries, Inc.29 involved a proxy solicitation for the
election of directors." Since the terms of four of Belmont's twelve directors
were about to expire, the board decided to nominate the four incumbent
directors for an additional term.3' After the decision to nominate the in-
cumbents for reelection was made, two of the nominees requested that
their names be withdrawn.3 Because the time for the election was near,
the board decided it would not replace the nominees and that it would
reduce the size of the Belmont board of directors.? The proxy solicitation
materials informed the shareholders that the present Belmont board num-
21 The Court rejected other claims by plaintiffs, finding that TSC's proxy statement
contained sufficient information to alert reasonable shareholders to the degree of control that
National Industries had over TSC and thus did not fail to disclose that National was TSC's
corporate parent. Id. at 452.
2 Id. at 440-41.
2 Id. at 454.
21 The letter informed TSC that the bank's evaluation of the fairness of the merger was
not based on the market price of TSC stock, but on projected prices. Id. at 456.
2 Id. at 454-57.
2 Id.
21 Id. at 457.
2 Lower courts since TSC have continued to use the "necessary to make statements not
false or misleading" test for materiality of omissions. See text accompanying notes 29-72
infra. But see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 IHRv. L. RlV. 1, 260-62 (1976) (TSC test
clearly applies to omissions but may not apply to representations and affirmative state-
ments).




3 Id. at 287.
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bered twelve, that the board had decided to nominate the four incumbent
directors for reelection, and that two of those directors had withdrawn for
health, family and personal reasons. The materials further disclosed that
the two incumbents did not intend to resign their other positions with
Belmont and that the board had determined that no replacement nomi-
nees would be sought. 4 Plaintiffs, seven minority shareholders,3 brought
suit alleging that the proxy materials violated the proxy solicitation provi-
sions because the materials failed to explain how the incumbents could
continue to serve in other positions with Belmont after resigning as direc-
tors for health, family, or personal reasons.36 The court held that omission
of any explanation of the incumbents' continued ability to serve did not
violate the proxy solicitation provisions."
The court cited the TSC test as the general measure of materiality. 8
The court stated that in the case of omissions, however, disclosure of the
omitted facts must be necessary to make affirmative statements not false
or misleading for the omissions to violate proxy law.39 Such a requirement,
it said, derived from the language of Rule 14a-9. 0 The court concluded that
the Rule proscribed only omissions of facts necessary to make affirmative
statements not false or misleading.41 The court found that the statements
made in Belmont's proxy statement concerning the reasons for the with-
drawal of the nominees and the nominees' plans for continued service were
complete in themselves and were not false. 41 Consequently, no explanation
of the continued service of the nominees was necessary to make the affirm-
" Id. The proxy statement stated in pertinent part:
Pursuant to the By-Laws of the Corporation, there are three classes of directors.
At present there are twelve directors of the Corporation .... [Tjerms for the
existing Class "A" directors expire in 1977. [The incumbent Class A directors]
... were nominated as Class "A" Directors for a three-year term expiring in 1980
at the Board of Directors meeting on February 22, 1977. However, [two of the
incumbents], citing health and family reasons, requested that [their names] be
withdrawn from nomination .... Management recommended to the Board of
Directors that in view of the short time period between [the withdrawals] and the
April 19, 1977 Stockholders' Meeting there be no replacement nominees... and by
Unanimous Consent,. . . the Board... reset the number of directors... at ten.
[The incumbents] indicated that they had no intention of resigning their other
positions with the Company at this time.
Id.
, Id. at 286. The plaintiffs collectively owned or controlled 30% of Belmont's outstanding
voting stock. Id.
11 Id. at 288. Plaintiffs charged that the proxy statement violated § 14(a) and Rule 14a-




Jo Id.; see note 19 supra.
The court said, "I have no doubt that...a rule prohibiting all omissions of material
facts in a proxy statement could have been promulgated; however, the SEC apparently saw
fit, in its expert judgment, to merely prohibit those omissions of material fact which render
the affirmative statements false or misleading." Id. at 290 (emphasis in original).
42 Id. at 291.
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ative statements in the proxy statement not false or misleading and omis-
sion of such an explanation, therefore, did not violate proxy law."
The court took the same approach to the materiality of omissions in
Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust.4" PREIT solic-
ited proxies for the approval of two real estate transactions. The first
involved a loan by PREIT to FPA Corporation." The second involved a
project to be undertaken by PREIT and Mid-Island Properties, Inc. as
joint venturers." PREIT's former joint venturer on the project, the son-in-
law of the president of Mid-Island, was to be replaced by Mid-Island."
Shareholders of PREIT alleged that the proxy materials seeking approval
for both transactions were defective. With respect to the first transaction,
plaintiffs alleged disclosure violations in that PREIT failed to disclose that
the terms of the final deal included an interest rate more favorable to FPA
Corporation than an earlier transaction." Plaintiffs also alleged that the
PREIT trustee who had negotiated the deal with FPA was an FPA share-
holder, a partner in the law firm which served as FPA's general counsel,
that he had a financial interest in both sides of the transaction, and that
these facts were not disclosed.49 With respect to the second transaction,
plaintiffs charged that the proxy statement omitted material facts because
it did not disclose that one of PREIT's trustees was the sole owner of Mid-
Island Properties or that the terms of the agreement with Mid-Island were
less favorable to PREIT than those of the earlier agreement with the son-
in-law of the president of Mid-Island." The court rejected plaintiffs'
claims.
5'
The court's analysis involved two steps. First, the court considered
whether the omitted facts were material, 5 and second, whether disclosure
4 Id.
11 432 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
4 PREIT was to finance a real estate project by making a guaranteed loan of $800,000
to FPA at an annual interest rate of 10%. Id. at 1305-06.
PREIT and Mid-Island were to be 50% partners in an apartment project. Id. at 1301.
PREIT was to invest $275,000 in the development of the project. Id. In return, PREIT was to
receive 10% of its original capital investment as a guaranteed annual payment. Id. Mid-Island
was to receive an equal annual payment. Id. After such payments to PREIT and Mid-Island,
the remainder of the annual cash flow from the project was to be distributed between PREIT
and Mid-Island with PREIT receiving 30% and Mid-Island 70%. Id.
47 Id.
4 Id. at 1305. An earlier proposed agreement between PREIT and FPA had provided for
an annual interest rate of 15% rather than 10%. Id. at 1305-06.
42 Id. at 1305.
5 Id. at 1301-02. The proxy statement disclosed that "[t]he Trust's 50% partner. . . is
Mid-Island Properties, Inc. . . .of which Morris A. Kravitz, a Trustee is President." Id. at
1301. The statement did not, however, reveal that Kravitz owned 100% of Mid-Island's stock.
Id. at 1302. The statement did not disclose that a previous partnership agreement between
PREIT and Kravitz' son-in-law for the same project had provided for a fifty-fifty division of
the cash flow rather than the seventy-thirty division in the new agreement. Id. at 1301-02.
' Id. at 1306.
" The court relied on the TSC test in determining whether the omissions were material.
Id. at 1300; see text accompanying notes 12-17 supra.
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of these facts was necessary to make the affirmative statements not false
or misleading.53 The court found that the omissions pertaining to the FPA
transaction, while not so obviously important to the reasonable share-
holder to warrant summary judgment for the plaintiff, were sufficiently
important to create a jury question on the materiality issue." The court
found that the Mid-Island project omissions made proper assessment of
the transaction by a reasonable shareholder impossible.5 Furthermore,
after the proxy statement at issue had been circulated, the SEC had found
the same facts omitted from that statement to be material and had advised
PREIT specifically to include them in a later proxy statement." Despite
its finding that the omitted facts were sufficiently important to be consid-
ered material, the court went on to find that disclosure was not necessary
to make affirmative statements not false or misleading.57 The court found
that such a requirement was supported by lower court decisions that had
preceded TSC55 and the purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions. 9
11 The court said:
Assuming arguendo, the materiality of the omitted facts as a matter of law, it
becomes necessary to determine whether or not defendants were legally obligated
to include such facts in the proxy statement. . . . [T]he omisions relied on do not
make any [statements in the proxy materials] false or misleading. Accordingly,
Rule 14a-9(a) has not been violated.
432 F. Supp. at 1304.
-" Id. at 1306. Because materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, summary judg-
ment is appropriate only when reasonable minds cannot differ on whether a fact is material.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 450. Before a defendant in a proxy law suit
is entitled to summary judgment, he must prove that a fact is not material. S. & S. Realty
Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Indus., Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,270, at 92,750-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
m 432 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
14 Id. at 1302. The court minimized the importance of the later SEC finding of material-
ity. The court found that SEC Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1977), which lists
information that must be included in proxy statements, did not require disclosure of the type
of information omitted from PREIT's proxy statement. 432 F. Supp. at 1303. The court held
that omission of information that was not required to be disclosed by Schedule 14A could
not violate proxy solicitation law. Id. The court's holding ignores the fact that Rule 14a-9
states, "The fact that a proxy statement. . . has been filed with or examined by the Com-
mission shall not be deemed a finding by the Commission that such material is. . . not false
or misleading .. " 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(b) (1977). The Rule continues with a list of items
that may be misleading.
The Rule does not attempt to list everything that may be misleading or suggest that
compliance with Schedule 14A immunizes a proxy solicitor from Rule 14a-9. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9(b) (1977). In light of the indefiniteness of SEC regulations, a specific finding by
the SEC that the precise facts involved in the Perelman case were material casts doubt upon
the court's statement that omission of information not required to be disclosed by Schedule
14A cannot violate proxy law. Cf. Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp. 234, 247 (D. Del.
1975) (no recovery for omission of material required by Schedule 14A without showing of
causation).
57 432 F. Supp. at 1304, 1306.
" Id. at 1304. The court cited Gould v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970); General Time
Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968); Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Supp.
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Since the purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions is to insure that
the information in proxy statements is accurate, omissions that do not
affect the accuracy of the statements made do not frustrate that purpose.
6 0
Furthermore, the court found that the desirability of enabling proxy solici-
tors to determine whether they were complying with the law supported its
holding.6 Drafters of proxy statements could not tell if they were comply-
ing with the law unless, at the time proxy statements were drafted they
had a standard by which to judge the materiality of facts. 2 Necessity of
disclosure to make affirmative statements not false or misleading provided
such a standard. Since the omissions in PREIT's proxy statement did not
meet this standard, the court rejected plaintiffs' claims.63
The approach to the issue of materiality of omissions taken by the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania is sound and consistent with the TSC
test. The requirement that disclosure of omitted facts be necessary to make
affirmative statements not false or misleading for an omission to be mate-
rial follows the clear language of Rule 14a-9.64 Furthermore, such an ap-
proach is consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of the omissions
in TSC. The TSC Court did not reject a requirement that disclosure be
necessary to make affirmative statements not false or misleading. 5 The
TSC Court's analysis, in fact, indicates that such a requirement is appro-
priate." As the Perelman opinion demonstrates, the TSC materiality test
and the requirement that disclosure be necessary to make affirmative
statements not false or misleading can be incorporated into a two-step
process without any apparent inconsistency. 7 Finally, a finding of materi-
ality carries with it a determination that an omission could have been
causally linked to shareholder voting decisions.68 Thus, materiality is the
most important element in proving a proxy law violation.69 If the TSC test
234 (D. Del. 1975); and C M C Corp. v. Kern County Land Co., 290 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal.
1968) in support of its holding. 432 F. Supp. at 1304-05.
so The court stated that the proxy solicitation provisions were intended to insure in-
formed shareholder voting decisions rather than to regulate day to day corporate manage-
ment. 432 F. Supp. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1300.
6, Id. at 1305. Presumably, the court feared that if solicitors were unable to determine
whether they were complying with the law, they would bury shareholders with trivial informa-
tion, thus frustrating the purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions. See text accompanying
note 13 supra.
12 See 432 F. Supp. at 1305.
0 Id. at 1306.
61 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
See text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
" See id.
67 The Perelman court applied the TSC test initially to determine whether the omissions
were material. 432 F. Supp. at 1300-01. Plaintiffs were not denied relief because the omissions
were not material, but because disclosure of the omitted facts was not necessary to make the
proxy statement not false or misleading. Id. at 1304, 1306. Thus, the court was able to
incorporate the TSC test easily into its two step analysis.
" Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970); see text accompanying note
6 supra; note 144 infra.
" See note 6 supra.
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provided the sole criterion for determining whether an omission violated
proxy solicitation law, drafters of proxy statements would be subjected to
liability by courts examining proxy statements with the benefit of hind-
sight.7 0 If, on the other hand, materiality of omissions is judged by the
effect of omissions on affirmative statements made, drafters of proxy state-
ments can measure the materiality of facts in advance by viewing the effect
of those facts on the affirmative statements that the drafters themselves
choose to make.7 1 Imposing a requirement that disclosure of omitted facts
be necessary to prevent affirmative statements from being false or mislead-
ing insures that liability for proxy law violations will result only when
omissions have frustrated the policy of meaningful disclosure."
Courts also have insured that liability for proxy law violations is as-
sessed only when necessary to promote the disclosure policy by rejecting
attempts by plaintiffs to convert proxy solicitation law into a vehicle for
policing corporate management. In doing so, courts have relied on the Su-
preme Court's holding in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.73 In Santa Fe,
the Court held that the purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to insure full disclosure
to shareholders and that prevention of unfairness is only a secondary pur-
pose of the Rule." Thus, unfairness, without material non-disclosure, does
not violate Rule 10b-5.
75
Because the purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions, like that of
Rule 10b-5, is to insure full disclosure," courts have adopted the Santa Fe
" See Shapiro v. Belmont Indus., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 284, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (TSC test
requires ex post facto determination whether there is substantial likelihood that shareholder
would have considered fact important); The Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 394
(TSC requires court to determine what reasonable inferences shareholder could have drawn
from omitted facts); cf. Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus.
LAW. 887, 898 (Apr. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Hewitt] (materiality should be judged from
perspective of shareholder at time of investment without benefit of hindsight).
11 Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, 432 F. Supp. at 1305. Giving
drafters of proxy statements a frame of reference for judging materiality supplies guidance
lacking in the TSC test. See Marsh & Andersen, supra note 8, at 342-44. But see Materiality
Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 358 (inability of proxy solicitors to predict what is
material is virtue of TSC test; solicitor forced to make full disclosure to protect himself from
liability).
72 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
- 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, Kirby Lumber Co. merged with Santa Fe Industries.
Id. at 466. Shareholders of Kirby brought suit alleging that the terms of Santa Fe's short form
merger were unfair and thus violative of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). 430 U.S.
at 466-67.
11 Id. at 478. The merger was achieved under the Delaware short form merger statute,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974), which permits parent corporations to merge with their
subsidiaries without the approval of the shareholders of the subsidiaries if the parent owns
90% or more of the subsidiaries' stock. 430 U.S. at 465. Santa Fe owned 95% of Kirby's stock
at the time of the merger. Id. Plaintiffs were, therefore, powerless to prevent the merger. Id.
at 474. Because plaintiffs had been informed of the merger and had no power to prevent its
consummation, the Court held that there had been no material non-disclosure. Id. Thus, the
full disclosure policy of Rule 10b-5 had been fulfilled. Id. at 478.
I5 d.
7 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
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rationale in proxy law suits. In Goldberger v. Baker," Health-Chem Corpo-
ration, of which the defendant was a director, solicited proxies for the
election of directors and approval of a stock option plan for executive
compensation." Health-Chem's directors had caused the corporation to
make loans to its corporate parents, to enter into a sale lease-back agree-
ment with an equipment company, and to sell fixed assets to a group
controlled by the defendants and then to lease the assets back from the
group.7" Plaintiffs alleged that these transactions violated Rule 10b-510 be-
cause the defendants benefited from, and Health-Chem was injured by,
the transactions."1 Plaintiffs charged that the proxy statement soliciting
votes for the election of directors violated the proxy solicitation provisions
because the statement did not reveal that the directorship candidates had
engaged in a "conspiracy. . . to defraud" in violation of Rule 10b-5.12 The
Goldberger court held that Health-Chem's proxy statement soliciting votes
for the election of directors did not violate the statutory disclosure
scheme."
The court first disposed of plaintiffs' 10b-5 claims. The court held that
in view of Santa Fe, plaintiffs' allegations that the terms of the loan and
the sale lease-back agreements were unfair to Health-Chem without alle-
gations that the terms of the agreements had not been disclosed or had
been disclosed in a misleading manner did not state a cause of action under
Rule 10b-5." With respect to plaintiffs' claims of proxy law violations, the
court held that because plaintiffs had failed to prove a conspiracy, Health-
Chem had not violated the proxy solicitation provisions by failing to dis-
close that directorship candidates had engaged in such a conspiracy. 5
Moreover, had the conspiracy been proved, plaintiffs would have shown
only instances of corporate mismanagement. The court found that the
proxy solicitation provisions, like Rule 10b-5, were not intended to prevent
corporate mismanagement. 7 Since plaintiffs' allegations were founded
upon charges of corporate mismanagement, the allegations were outside
442 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
7' Id. at 665-66.
7 Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 665; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
' 442 F. Supp. at 662-63.
Id. at 666. The plaintiffs also alleged defects in proxy statements seeking authorization
for increased shares of junior preferred stock. Id. at 665-66. Those allegations are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 206-11 infra.
442 F. Supp. at 662.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 667.
'' Id. The court saw plaintiffs' complaint as part of an "increasingly popular tendency
among litigants [to] attempt to transform what might be valid claims under state law into
federal securities law claims." Id. at 667-68.
'q Id. at 667; cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 380-82 (1970) (fairness or
unfairness of merger has no bearing on whether proxy law violated); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (purpose of § 14 is to prevent management abuses by insuring
informed voters); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1971) (proxy'law impro-
per vehicle for attack on fairness of transaction).
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the scope of proxy law.8 8 The court held that plaintiffs could not transform
breaches of fiduciary duties into proxy law violations by alleging failure to
disclose such breaches in proxy statements.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the proxy statement soliciting shareholder
approval of the stock option plan violated the proxy solicitation provisions
because the statement did not disclose the current market price of Health-
Chem's common stock or the value of the stock option plan. 0 The court
found that the omissions were immaterial and, therefore, that the proxy
statement had not violated the disclosure scheme.' Since Health-Chem's
stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange, the prevailing price
of Health-Chem's stock was a matter of public knowledge. 3 Armed with
knowledge of the price, shareholders could calculate the value of the stock
option plan by "simple arithmetic." 4 Because shareholders had access to
information with which to evaluate the proposed plan, omission of the
price of Health-Chem's stock and the value of the plan did not impair
informed voting decisions. Such omissions, therefore, did not violate the
proxy solicitation provisions. The Goldberger opinion reflects the ration-
ale of the Supreme Court in Santa Fe that liability under securities law
should be assessed only when doing so will further the purpose of the
securities laws.8 The Goldberger court recognized that holding Health-
Chem liable for proxy law violations because of unfairness or omission of
cumulative information when shareholders had been given all of the infor-
mation necessary for an informed voting decision would not further the
purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions to insure meaningful disclo-
sure. 7
The Santa Fe rationale also was applied in Browning Debenture Hold-
ers' Committee v. DASA Corp.8 DASA solicited proxies from holders of
convertible debentures to obtain approval for the sale of computers.8 To
induce approval, DASA offered to reduce the conversion rate for deben-
tures held by the plaintiffs and others. °0 Plaintiffs disapproved of the
1 442 F. Supp. at 667-68.
99 Id.
10 Id. at 667.
I !d.
92 Id. at 662.
Id. at 667.
I d.
Id.; see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 775 (3d Cir. 1976)
(market price available to all shareholders; failure to disclose not material); Ash v. LFE
Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1975) (proxy solicitor not bound to assume shareholders
cannot subtract to determine value of stock option plan).
" See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
"7 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1080-81.
' Id. Plaintiffs were a committee of individuals who had purchased 2% of the converti-
ble debentures issued by Cybertronics, Inc. Cybertronics subsequently had merged with




proposed reduction in the conversion rate and submitted an alternative
proposal to the DASA board. Because plaintiffs' proposal was submitted
only three days before the annual meeting at which the vote was to be
taken, the proposal was not included in the proxy materials circulated to
debenture holders. 01 Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy materials were defec-
tive because they did not disclose the method used to derive the conversion
rate to be offered to debenture holders or that the rate itself was unfair.
0 2
The court rejected plaintiffs' claims," 3 interpreting plaintiffs' claims as an
attempt to recover for a breach of a fiduciary duty on the part of the DASA
directors.' 4 Citing Santa Fe, the court stated that federal law imposed no
fiduciary duties on directors."' The acts of which plaintiffs complained,
therefore, were outside the scope of the proxy solicitation provisions and
were a matter for state law.' 6 Consequently, the court concluded that
plaintiffs were not entitled to relief."'
Plaintiffs further alleged that DASA had violated proxy laws by failing
to disclose in its proxy statement that it intended to offer a further reduc-
tion in the conversion rate to debenture holders who approved the com-
puter sale."' The Second Circuit held that DASA had no duty to disclose
its plan because such disclosure might have been misleading.' The court
reasoned that if debenture holders had tendered their holdings at the re-
duced rate en masse, DASA might have been unable to meet the demand
and thus would have been forced to abandon the plan. If the plan had been
abandoned, debenture holders who approved the sale anticipating that
they would be rewarded by a more favorable rate would be disappointed
,-, Id. The SEC currently is considering a revision of its rules to enable shareholders to
submit proposals directly to other shareholders without having to go through management.
Egan, Will Proxy Fights Replace Tender Offer Bids?, Wash. Post, March 16, 1978, section C
at 1, col. 1. Such a revision would obviate the problem faced by the plaintiffs in Browning.




"I Id. The proxy solicitation laws were not intended to insure the fulfillment of fiduciary
duties under state law. H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). If failure to disclose
breaches of fiduciary duty gave rise to a federal proxy law action, differences in procedural
requirements and burdens of proof would encourage shareholders to seek relief in federal court
for breaches of fiduciary duty to the exclusion of state courts. The Standard of Materiality,
supra note 8, at 400-04. The advantages of suing in federal as opposed to state courts include
the availability of nationwide service of process, the absence of the security bond requirement
common in many states, the availability of attorney's fees and other expenses, and the lack
of necessity for showing all of the elements of common law fraud. False and Misleading Proxy
Statements, supra note 9, at 167-73. In addition, while shareholder suits in many states are
triable only in courts of equity, a jury trial is available in federal court on the issue of
damages. Id. at 172. Relegating plaintiffs to state court remedies accords not only with Santa
Fe, but with the general trend of the Supreme Court in federal securities law cases. See, e.g.,
Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84-85
(1975).
560 F.2d at 1084.
,0 Id. at 1085.
200 Id.
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when they tendered their holdings.' The court held, therefore, that the
plan to offer further reductions in the conversion rate was too uncertain to
be disclosed in DASA's proxy statement because of the possibility that the
plan might be abandoned."'
In concentrating on the state law aspects of the fairness of the conver-
sion rate, the court deprived the debenture holders of the opportunity to
decide for themselves whether the rate was fair. Plaintiffs sought disclosure
not only of the unfairness of the rate, but of the method by which the rate
was derived." 2While conclusions as to fairness may be a question of state
law and, therefore, not a proper matter for inclusion in proxy statements,
the debenture holders should have been provided with the necessary data
for evaluating the fairness of the conversion rate themselves. The conver-
sion rate was an integral part of the transaction for which proxy approval
was being solicited. The fairness of the conversion rate was central to the
voting decisions and the means by which that rate was determined was
essential to evaluating the fairness of the rate."3 Thus, the Browning court
lost sight of the meaningful disclosure policy of the proxy solicitation provi-
sions. The Court's doctrinaire application of Santa Fe to foreclose judicial
scrutiny in all proxy solicitation suits where matters arguably within the
ambit of state law are raised denied plaintiffs access to information neces-
sary for an informed evaluation of corporate transactions.
The right of shareholders *to information sufficient to permit an evalua-
tion of coorporate transactions formed the basis for findings of materiality
in SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co."4 Parklane solicited proxies for approval
of a merger. The SEC alleged that Parklane had violated proxy solicitation
law because its proxy statement did not disclose that the purpose of the
merger was to enable the president of the company to pay off personal
debts. ' 5 In addition, Parklane's proxy statement did not disclose that the
appraiser who had determined the value of Parklane's stock for the purpose
'in Id.
Id.
2 Id. at 1084. To the extent that plaintiffs sought disclosure of the "unfairness" of the
conversion rate, they relied on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty and thus sought disclosure
of a speculative legal theory. See Ash. v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975) (disclo-
sure of speculative issues of state law not required). Plaintiffs, however, sought disclosure of
the method of deriving the conversion rate as well. Such disclosure does not involve specula-
tive legal theories, but objective mathematical formulae and raw data used in calculating the
conversion rate.
113 The importance of the conversion rate to debenture holders' voting decisions is under-
scored by the fact that the reduction in the rate was offered for the express purpose of
inducing approval of the computer sale. 560 F.2d at 1081. Moreover, the debenture holders
had sufficient interest in the conversion rate to offer their own proposal. Id. at 1081-82. Rule
14a-9 was intended to replace "caveat emptor" in the shareholder voting process. How Much
Information?, supra note 8, at 725. Requiring the debenture holders to vote on the basis of
undisclosed and unexplained data is inconsistent with that purpose. See Ash v. LFE Corp.,
525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975) (no need to disclose conclusions about fairness when underly-
ing data disclosed).
'" 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
,i Id. at 1085.
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of the transaction had not been informed of the president's personal stake
in the matter."' Furthermore, the SEC charged that the proxy statement
affirmatively misstated that no negotiations for the cancellation of a Park-
lane leasehold were currently underway when such negotiations were, in
fact, in progress. " 7 The Second Circuit found that the alleged omissions
and misstatements were material."'
The court rejected Parklane's argument that the purpose of the merger
was immaterial because the minority shareholders did not have sufficient
votes to block the merger and, therefore, were faced only with a choice
between accepting the price offered for their shares or opting for ap-
praisal."' Parklane contended that price was the only important factor to
shareholders faced with such a choice.'2 ' The court found that the share-
holders could have sought to enjoin the merger under state law had the
purpose of the merger been disclosed.' The purpose, therefore, was impor-
tant to reasonable shareholders.
2
The court's handling of the omission of the purpose of the merger goes
more to causation than materiality.' For purposes of materiality, the
importance that a shareholder would attach to omitted information in
deciding how to vote, not the ultimate vote or the power of that vote to
defeat a transaction, should be the focus of the inquiry. Regardless of
whether shareholders have sufficient votes to block a merger, they still
have the option of voting against it. Shareholder votes are not meaningless
even when those votes, cannot have any real effect.2 4 If solicitation of
shareholder votes is to remain meaningful, shareholders must have the
benefit of the full disclosure provided by proxy law.'2 5 The court, in its
analysis, did not focus on the importance of the omitted information to
shareholder voting decisions. Rather, it emphasized the options other than
voting by which shareholders could have defeated the merger. 26 Despite
the improper focus of the court's analysis, its finding of materiality is
correct because a reasonable shareholder would consider the purpose of a
118 Id.
"' Id. The SEC also alleged numerous other securities law violations. Only the proxy law
violations, however, were before the Second Circuit on appeal. Id.
6 Id. at 1088-89.




'2 For a discussion of the causation aspects of the Parklane decision, see text accompany-
ing notes 228-43 infra.
"I Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 1974).
"2 Id. at 383; see text accompanying notes 239-43 infra.
126 558 F.2d at 1088. Courts frequently have focused on decisions other than voting
choices in situations in which minotiry shareholders have insufficient votes to defeat a trans-
action. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 772 (3d Cir. 1976)
(shareholder choice whether to negotiate for more favorable merger terms); Schlick v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974) (shareholder choice whether to seek to
enjoin merger); Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 127 (shareholder must show that
information was important to decision whether to "take steps" to prevent injury).
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proposed merger important in deciding whether to vote for or against it.'"
The court also found that the appraiser's lack of knowledge of the
purpose of the merger was material information.'1 Shareholders, faced
with a decision whether to accept the price for their shares based on an
appraisal, would consider the accuracy of the appraisal important in mak-
ing that choice.'2 9 Since the appraiser's lack of knowledge of the reason for
the merger might affect the accuracy of the appraisal, failure to disclose
that lack of knowledge constituted a material omission.' 30 The court found
that the misstatement of the status of the leasehold negotiations was mate-
rial because Parklane itself, in stating that there were no negotiations in
progress, indicated that the status of negotiations relating to the cancella-
tion of the leasehold was material.' 3' The court found further indications
of materiality in the fact that Parklane's president had expressed a belief
in the importance of the cancellation'32 and that the revenues from the
cancellation, if consummated, would have constituted a major portion of
Parklane's earnings for the year.
33
Although the Parklane court quoted the TSC test of materiality,'34 the
court's analysis of the misstatement ignores the very language quoted. The
TSC test requires courts to focus on the importance of a fact to a share-
holder, yet the Parklane court examined the materiality of the misstate-
ment of the status of the leasehold negotiations from the perspective of
Parklane 35 Rather than determining whether shareholders would consider
the leasehold negotiations important, the court viewed the negotiations as
important because Parklane and its president considered them impor-
tant. '
" See text accompanying notes 124-25 supra.
' 558 F.2d at 1088-89.
12, Id. at 1089.
130 Id.
'2' Id. at 1088-89.
t Id. at 1089. Parklane's president, in a letter to a bank from which he had made a
personal loan, had indicated that Parklane might "be heading towards a deal that would net
Parklane $300,000. ... Id.
"1 Id. The court compared the projected revenues from the cancellation, estimated at a
minimum of $150,000, to Parklane's net earnings of $500,000 for the previous year in reaching
its conclusion. Id.
" Id. at 1087-88.
" The focus of the court's analysis was influenced by its adherence to the test for
materiality in 10b-5 cases announced in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The Parklane court found that materiality of
the leasehold negotiation omissions was to be determined by "a balancing of both the indi-
cated probability that an event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light
of the totality of the company activity." 558 F.2d at 1089. In order to determine the "indicated
probability" of the occurence of the cancellation of the leasehold and the "magnitude" of such
an occurrence "in light of. . . company activity," the court was forced to examine the trans-
action from the standpoint of those who controlled the negotiations and thus had the power
to decide whether the cancellation would occur. Consequently, the court examined the im-
portance of the omission from the standpoint of the Parklane management rather than from
the standpoint of the shareholders. Id. at 1089.
'1 Id. at 1088-89.
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The decisions of the lower courts in the wake of TSC indicate that the
potential of the Supreme Court's test for imposition of liability on proxy
solicitors due to retrospective findings of materiality has not gone unnot-
iced. 37 The courts have attempted to facilitate prospective determinations
of materiality by evaluating omissions in relation to affirmative statements
made,'38 limiting findings of materiality to established facts,'39 requiring
plaintiffs to take the initiative in discovering easily available facts, 4 ' and
evaluating materiality from the standpoint of the proxy solicitor.', This
further definition of the TSC test aids drafters of proxy statements. Rather
than being required to anticipate what shareholders will consider impor-
tant or, more importantly, what courts will find that shareholders consider
important, proxy solicitors can judge the sufficiency of proxy statements
in advance by considering the effect of facts on the disclosures made, the
importance of those facts to the solicitor, and the ease with which share-
holders can discover information for themselves.12
B. Causation
Causation represents another vehicle by which proxy solicitors can be
protected from overly broad liability. Solicitors are not liable for material
misstatements and omissions unless there is a causal link between the
misstatement or omission and the injury to shareholders.' Thus, even if
the concept of materiality were construed liberally, proxy solicitors could
be protected from liability by strict construction of the causation require-
ment.' The Supreme Court formulated the test for causation in Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co.'45 The Court rejected a subjective test of showing
the effect that a misstatement or omission has on shareholder voting,
137 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 29-71 supra.
,3' See text accompanying notes 72-113 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 90-95 supra.
14 See text accompanying notes 128-36 supra.
1 The courts have exercised care in defining the concept of materiality because of the
importance of materiality in proxy solicitation law suits. See note 6 supra. The materiality
requirement serves to insure that only important misstatements or omissions provide the
basis for proxy law suits. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). If
materiality is construed too broadly, suits predicated upon minor misstatements and omis-
sions could result. See id. While the approaches taken by the lower courts have focused on
the materiality issue from perspectives other than that of the shareholder, see text accompa-
nying notes 137-41 supra, such a focus is not necessarily an abrogation of the TSC test. The
lower court opinions can be viewed as attempts to define what the reasonable shareholder
rightfully may consider important in terms of importance to management, certainty of factual
support, availability of information, and effect of omissions on affirmative statements made
in proxy statements.
" See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970).
',, The inverse relation between materiality and causation is supported by the language
of the Supreme Court. The Court indicated that the stronger a showing of materiality is, the
less stringent the requirements for causation become. Id. at 384-85.
I's 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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announcing an objective test instead.'46 Sufficient causation is established
if the proxy solicitation, as distinguished from the vote, was "an essential
link in the accomplishment of the transaction."'' 7 The type of causation
established by the fulfillment of the Mills test frequently is called
"transaction causation" because of the focus on the role that the proxy
solicitation played in bringing about corporate transactions.' The need to
show another type of causation, often called "loss causation," also is sug-
gested by the Mills decision. Loss causation focuses upon the causal rela-
tionship between the proxy solicitation and the injury to shareholders." 9
The need to show loss causation is suggested by the Mills Court's holding
that damages should be allowed only to the extent that they can be
proved. "' Lower courts have required a showing of both transaction and
loss causation in proxy law actions.'51
On remand in Mills, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme
Court's opinion as requiring a showing of both transaction and loss causa-
tion. 2 The suit in Mills arose out of a solicitation of proxies for the ap-
proval of a merger of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler Linotype Co.'53 Auto-
Lite's proxy materials stated that the Auto-Lite board endorsed the
merger.'5' Plaintiffs alleged that the proxy statement was defective because
it failed to disclose that the Auto-Lite board was controlled by Mergen-
thaler.' 5 By the time the case reached the Seventh Circuit on remand,
materiality and transaction causation had been established." Plaintiffs
sought recovery of damages allegedly resulting from the illegally achieved
merger.'51 The court held that they were not entitled to relief."L
The court interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion as limiting plain-
tiffs' damage claims to a loss of earnings or earnings potential of their
,' Id. at 384-85.
, Id. at 385.
,' See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974); The
Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 385; Note, Loss and Transaction Causation: The
Second Circuit Resolves the Causation Controversy in Majority Control Situations, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 683, 693 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Loss and Transaction Causation].
"' See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974); The
Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 385; Loss and Transaction Causation, supra note
148, at 693.
1" 396 U.S. at 389.
,5, See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974);
cf. Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Mills
set standard for causation in securities act cases generally; must show transaction and loss
causation).
"2 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1241 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
398 (1977).
'" 552 F.2d at 1240. Prior to the attempted merger, Mergenthaler had gained control of
Auto-Lite by acquiring 54.2% of Auto-Lite's stock. Id.
154 Id.
155 [d.
'' Id.; see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 378-85.




shares resulting from the merger that was achieved by means of the decep-
tive proxy statement.1 9 The court examined the dividends received by
Auto-Lite shareholders before and after the merger, "' the comparative
earnings of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler,' " and the comparative market
values of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler stock "' to determine whether the
plaintiffs had suffered damages.' The court concluded that plaintiffs had
in fact received a financial benefit from the merger."4 Consequently, plain-
tiffs had shown no injury on which an award of damages could be based. "
The court's treatment of the causation issue represents a careful imple-
mentation of the language of the Supreme Court.166 Moreover, requiring
both transaction and loss causation accords with the decisions of lower
courts"7 and the language of the Act limiting plaintiff recoveries to actual
damages.' 8
One problem with application of the Mills test is the difficulty of identi-
fying the transaction to which the proxy solicitation must be an essential
link. '6 The problem is exemplified by the analysis of the court for the
Southern District of New York in Limmer v. General Telephone & Elec-
tronics Corp.17 GTE solicited proxies for the reelection of directors. Plain-
', Id. at 1241.
" Id. at 1241-42. The court found that Auto-Lite shareholders had received annual
dividends of $2.40 per share before the merger and $2.63 per share after the merger. Id. at
1242.
18 Id. at 1243.
'6 Id. at 1245-46.
" Id. at 1241-49.
," Id. at 1248-49. For an analysis of the court's treatment of the damage issue, see Note,
Enforcement of Proxy Regulations in Parent-Subsidiary Mergers, 35 WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv.
255 (1978).
"1 522 F.2d at 1249.
288 The Supreme Court clearly instructed that "damages should be recoverable only to
the extent that they can be shown." 396 U.S. at 388-89. The Seventh Circuit's exhaustive
analysis of a complicated transaction is a conscientious attempt to determine if damages
could be shown. See 552 F.2d at 1241.
"I See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974);
Sisters of the Precious Blood, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
In Sisters, plaintiff shareholders submitted a proposed resolution requesting the directors of
Bristol-Myers to write a report describing the company's marketing of infant formula prod-
ucts in developing countries. 431 F. Supp. at 386. Bristol-Myers included plaintiffs' resolution
in its proxy materials and circulated proxies to shareholders. Id. Plaintiffs charged that the
proxy materials were defective because the description of Bristol-Myers' marketing of infant
formula in developing countries was inaccurate. Id. The Sisters court held that plaintiffs
could not show loss causation because plaintiffs' resolution only requested that a report be
prepared. Id. Because Bristol-Myers' directors could have refused to prepare the report had
the resolution passed, plaintiffs were entitled to no relief. Id. at 386-87.
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976) states in pertinent part, "No person permitted to maintain
a suit for damages under this chapter shall recover. . . a total amount in excess of his actual
damages on account of the act complained of." Id.
" The Mills test requires that the proxy statement be an essential link to the accom-
plishment of "the transaction," but does not indicate how the relevant transaction is to be
identified. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 385.
1'* [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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tiffs brought a shareholders' derivative action charging that the proxy
statement was defective because it failed to disclose that the incumbent
directors of GTE had diverted corporate funds illegally for the purpose of
bribing domestic and foreign government officials.' The court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted."2
The court held that proxy laws were intended to prevent or redress
injury to shareholders resulting from transactions for which authorization
had been obtained by defective proxy materials."3 Plaintiffs' injuries had
resulted from the illegal diversion of funds.' While recognizing that the
diversion of funds could not continue unless the directors were reelected,
the court found the link between the proxy solicitation and the diversion
of funds "too tenuous" to justify federal intervention into a case of a breach
of a fiduciary duty.7 5 Such cases, the court said, are properly a matter for
state courts.'70 The proxy materials on which plaintiffs' claims were predi-
cated had not sought authorization for the diversion of funds, but had
solicited votes for the election of directors.' The court noted that if the
transaction were characterized as the reelection of directors so as to create
a federal securities law claim, every reelection of directors would give rise
to causes of action under proxy solicitation laws.'
The Limmer court's decision is correct in light of the Mills causation
test. Even if reelection had been the relevant transaction, loss causation
could not have been shown. Although the defective proxy solicitation was
an essential link to the reelection of the directors, the reelection could not
be considered a contributing factor in the losses that plaintiffs had sus-
tained prior to the election.' 9 Insofar as damages from future diversion of
funds are concerned, whether the directors will engage in continued illegal
conduct is a matter of speculation. Therefore, proof of the actual damages
caused by the defective proxy statement would be impossible.'80
"I, Id. at 92,002. Plaintiffs also asserted pendent claims based on a breach of fiduciary
duty under state law. Id.
172 Id. at 92,003.
'7' See note 106 supra.
'7' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111, at 92,002.
175 Id.
'71 Id. at 92,002-03. Denying plaintiffs relief under federal securities law when adequate
remedies are available in state courts accords with recent Supreme Court decisions. See text
accompanying note 106 supra.
'" [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111, at 92,002. The reason
for the court's holding was that plaintiffs's damages flowed from the illegal diversion of funds
rather than the reelection of directors. Id.
"7 Id. at 92,003.
'7, The proxy vote electing directors for a new term could enable only future conduct.
Any damages that had accrued prior to the election were in effect caused by the proxy vote
that had elected directors to the terms that were about to end. See id.
"I Plaintiffs could not establish the extent of such future speculative damages. Conse-
quently, they could not meet the burden of proving actual damages. See text accompanying
notes 166-68 supra. Denying plaintiffs relief under federal securities law when damage claims
are speculative accords with recent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v.
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A similar approach to the characterization of the relevant transaction
was taken by the court in Halle & Stieglitz v. Empress International,
Ltd.' The Empress board decided that it would offer to exchange deben-
tures for its publicly held common stock.'8 2 The offer was intended to
reduce Empress's operating costs by converting it from a publicly owned
to a privately owned company, thus averting a financial crisis., After the
decision to make the offer was made, but before the offer itself, Empress
solicited proxies for the reelection of directors.'84 After the election was held
and the incumbent directors were reelected, Empress offered the exchange
of debentures."' Plaintiffs exchanged a large portion of their holdings.8 '
Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the proxy statement soliciting votes for
the reelection of directors was defective because it failed to disclose the
directors' plan to exchange debentures for Empress common stock, thus
effectively eliminating plaintiffs' ownership of the company.' 7 The court,
however, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.'1
The court found that plaintiffs' injuries resulted from the elimination
of their ownership interests.8 9 The offer of the debentures, therefore, and
not the election of directors, was the transaction to which plaintiffs had to
show the defective proxy statement was causally related."10 The court
found that the proxy solicitation sought authorization only for the election
of directors and not the offer to exchange debentures for Empress common
stock."' Moreover, since the debenture offer could be made on the author-
ity of the directors alone, no shareholder approval of the offer was neces-
sary. 8 2 Consequently, plaintiffs could not trace their injuries to the defec-
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975) (plaintiffs who did not buy or sell securities
cannot prove damages; therefore, cannot sue under Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977)).
Plaintiffs are free to seek redress for breaches of fiduciary duty in state court. See note 106
supra.
"' 442 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1977).
,' Id. at 220.
' Id. at 219-20. In the two year period before the offer to exchange debentures for
common stock, the price of Empress common stock had fallen precipitously. Id. at 219.
'" Id. at 220-21. The exchange offer was to be made on September 24, 1974. Id. at 220.
The proxy statement soliciting votes for the reelection of directors was disseminated on
August 21, 1974. Id. at 221.
" Id. at 220.
, 6 Plaintiffs, holders of 28,900 shares, exchanged 18,400 of those shares and sold an
additional 10,000 shares in the arbitrage market resulting from the exchange offer. Thus,
plaintiffs retained only 500 of their original 28,900 share holdings. Id. at 220-21.
" Id. at 221-22.
'' Id. at 225-26, 228-29.
'u Id. at 225. The court said, "Any injury... could only have been the result of the




"I Id. The court said, "[Tihe proxy solicitation could not have been an essential link
in the accomplishment of the tender offer because no shareholder vote was required to author-
ize the offer." Id.
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tive proxy statement and, therefore, could not satisfy the causation re-
quirement.' 3
The court's treatment of the causation issue is more troublesome than
the decision in Limmer."14 The plaintiffs in Limmer could not show that
they had been injured by the defective proxy statement because it was
uncertain that the directors whose elections were procured by that state-
ment would engage in future illegal conduct. The plaintiffs in Halle, how-
ever, were able to show that the defective proxy statement had brought
about the election of directors, that those directors had then carried out a
plan to exchange debentures for common stock, and that the plaintiffs had
been injured by the exchange.' 5 The Limmer court's concern that all elec-
tions of directors would give rise to federal proxy law claims if the election
were characterized as the relevant transaction, however, is equally appos-
ite in Halle."' If the court had found the causation requirement met in
Halle, any time that directors took action injurious to shareholders, share-
holders could search the proxy statement by means of which the directors
had been elected for defects and, if any were present, bring a federal proxy
law suit.' 7 Such a result would not further the purpose of the proxy solici-
tation provisions to insure informed shareholder voting.'8 Omission of
facts unrelated to the voting decision shareholders are being asked to make
does not deprive shareholders of information necessary for an informed
voting decision."9 Expansive application of the proxy solicitation provi-
sions would convert them into a scheme for policing corporate mismanage-
193 Id.
"I See text accompanying notes 170-80 supra.
I's By the time the plaintiffs brought suit, Empress' directors had carried out the plan
that the plaintiffs had alleged the proxy statement had not disclosed. 442 F. Supp. at 221.
Plaintiffs' ownership interest in Empress effectively had been eliminated and whatever
damage the plan would cause to plaintiffs had accrued already. Id. at 220-21.
" See text accompanying notes 175-80 supra. Although any injuries suffered by plain-
tiffs resulted from the exchange of debentures, the Halle plaintiffs were attempting to allege
proxy violations in connection with the reelection of directors based on a bootstrap argument
that the exchange could not have taken place "but for" the election. 442 F. Supp. at 225.
,27 See 442 F. Supp. at 225.
", The framers of the proxy solicitation provisions regarded the purposes of providing
full disclosure and fulfillment of fiduciary duties as independent. See H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). Relying on defects in the proxy materials soliciting votes for
the election of directors to invalidate subsequent corporate transactions serves the latter
purpose. See Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,111, at 92,003.
"' The purpose of the proxy solicitation provisions is to insure that proxy statements
include "an explanation to the shareholders of the real nature of the questions for which
authority to cast his vote is sought." S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) (emphasis
added). Disclosure of information relating to questions other than those on which shareholder
opinion is solicited does not serve this purpose. Disclosure of unrelated information might
frustrate informed shareholder voting by confusing the shareholder voting decision with ex-
traneous information. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 448-49; Hewitt,
supra note 70, at 892; Materiality Defined for Rule 14a-9, supra note 6, at 354-56.
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ment rather than a scheme to insure informed shareholder voters as in-
tended. °0
Characterization of the relevant transaction was the crucial issue in
Goldberger v. Baker."0' Health-Chem Corp., of which the defendant was a
director, solicited proxies for the authorization of increased shares of junior
preferred stock."' The proxy statement failed to disclose that the directors
of Health-Chem had, over the course of several years, redeemed shares of
junior preferred stock held by Health-Chem's parent, Health-Med Corp.
enabling the defendant directors of Health-Chem to receive preferential
dividends.23 The court found that plaintiffs had failed to allege causation
and, in any event, that no causation could be shown.204
The plaintiffs' injury, the court concluded, had resulted from the al-
leged fraudulent redemption of junior preferred stock rather than the issu-
ance of more shares.2 5 Plaintiffs, therefore, needed to show a causal
connection between the defective proxy statement and the redemption of
stock.216 The court said that the shareholders' vote authorizing the issuance
of more stock did not cause or authorize the alleged fraudulent redemp-
tion.2"7 Consequently, the court held that plaintiffs had not established the
requisite causation.2 18 The rationale underlying the Limmer and Halle de-
cisions supports the Goldberger decision as well. The defective proxy solici-
tation could not have caused the redemption of stock that already had
been accomplished when proxies were solicited.2 0 Although issuance of
more shares might have made future redemption possible, whether such
redemptions would have occurred in fact was speculative. 20 Consequently,
damages could not be measured and plaintiffs could not prove causation.21,
Not all courts have construed the causation requirement strictly. The
Southern District of New York gave the Mills objective test a liberal con-
-0 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 380-82; J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1971); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934); text
accompanying note 106 supra.
"' [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For
a discussion of the materiality aspects of the Goldberger decision, see text accompanying
notes 77-95 supra.
212 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,203, at 92,424, 92,427.
Id. at 92,427-28.
2 Id. at 92,428-29.
21 See id. at 92,428.
210 Id. Thd court said, "There is no allegation that the redemption was authorized or
otherwise brought about by the shareholders' vote authorizing the issuance of more shares.
Causation is, of course, a necessary element under Rule 14a-9." Id.
"I Id. The court said, "[P]laintiffs make no allegation of a causal relationship between
the proxy statement used to authorize an increase in shares, and the alleged fraudulent
redemption of shares." Id.
210 Id. at 92,429.
20 See text accompanying notes 170-200 supra.
210 See text accompanying notes 173-80 supra.
211 See id.
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struction in Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co. 212 Skelly Oil solicited proxies for
approval of a merger of the company into Getty Oil Co.2 13 The terms of the
proposed merger provided that Skelly shareholders would be given Getty
stock in exchange for their holdings.2 1 1 Plaintiff shareholders brought suit
alleging that the proxy statement had misstated the means by which the
exchange ratio for Skelly and Getty stock had been derived, the position
of Skelly shareholders in relation to Getty shareholders, and that the ex-
perts who had advised Getty and Skelly on the fairness of the merger were
independent. 215 Plaintiffs further alleged that the proxy statement failed
to disclose the reason for calculating the value of Skelly's assets by book
value,'2 16 that no negotiator had represented Skelly in good faith in deter-
mining the terms of the merger, that there was no legitimate purpose for
the merger, and that the merger would benefit Getty to the detriment of
Skelly.21 Despite the misstatements and omissions, plaintiffs admitted
that they had not been misled.21 8 The court nevertheless denied defen-
dants' motion to dismiss the suit.
29
Defendants contended that the court should dismiss the suit because
plaintiffs' admission that they had not been deceived by the defective
proxy statement prevented a showing of causation.2 20 The court, however,
found that the proxy statement might have deceived others, thus affecting
the market for Skelly stock adversely.22' The adverse market effect would
extend not only to the holdings of deceived shareholders, but to those of
the plaintiffs as well. 2 2 Consequently, the deceptive proxy statement
would damage shareholders who were not deceived by the misstatements
and omissions and the fact that plaintiffs themselves had not been de-
ceived did not preclude a showing of causation.
2
2
212 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
213 Id. at 92,745.
214 Id. at 92,746, Skelly shareholders were to receive .5875 Getty shares for every Skelly
share exchanged as a result of the merger. Id.
215 Id.
226 Id. Plaintiffs asserted that the value of Skelly's assets should have been calculated
on an "appraised value" basis and the use of "book value" had caused an undervaluation of
Skelly's assets. Id.
211 Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the merger was part of a scheme to benefit Getty at Skelly's
expense by deliberately undervaluing Skelly's assets, overvaluing Getty's assets, and thus
creating an unfair exchange ratio. Id.
221 Id. The court explained the lack of deception by characterizing plaintiffs as
"sophisticated investors well acquainted with the affairs of both Skelly and Getty." Id.
2119 Id. at 92,749.
2O Id. at 92,747.
221 Id.
2 Id.
Id. The Clayton decision also is noteworthy because the court held that causation
could be shown even though minority shareholders did not have enough votes to block the
merger nor statutory appraisal rights. Id. at 92,746. In Mills, the Supreme Court left open
the issue whether causation could be shown in such circumstances. 396 U.S. at 385 n.7. For
a discussion of causation in instances in which minority shareholders cannot block corporate
transactions, see text accompanying notes 228-43 infra.
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The Clayton decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding
that causation is to be determined by an objective, rather than subjective,
test.Y Requiring plaintiffs to prove subjective deception in response to a
motion to dismiss would impose the same proof problems removed by Mills
from plaintiffs' case in chief.12 Furthermore, permitting plaintiffs who
were not deceived by defective proxy statements to sue effectuates the
"broad remedial purpose" of the proxy solicitation laws. 5 Such plaintiffs
are more likely to be congnizant of proxy statement defects, and thus more
likely to sue, than shareholders who are deceived by defective proxy state-
ments.
22
A liberal treatment of the causation requirement also is apparent in
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co.22 In Parklane, the Second Circuit expanded
the causation concept by addressing an issue left open by Mills. The Mills
Court expressly refused to decide whether transaction causation could be
shown when the party soliciting proxies possessed enough votes to insure
the approval of a merger regardless of how the solicited proxies were
voted. 2 1 Parklane solicited proxies for approval of a "going private"
merger. 0 Plaintiffs, minority shareholders with insufficient votes to block
the merger, alleged that Parklane's proxy statement was defective because
it failed to disclose that the purpose of the merger was to enable -the
president of Parklane to pay off his personal debts.Y The court held that
2,1 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 385; The Standard of Materiality,
supra note 8, at 385-91 (Mills causation test substitutes objective standard of materiality for
subjective standard of reliance); text accompanying notes 145-47 supra.
rn See The Standard of Materiality, supra note 8, at 385-91. Proof of subjective causation
or reliance is difficult in modem securities cases because of the large size and impersonal
nature of the market. Plaintiffs would be faced with having to show the state of mind of many
investors who had no contact with each other. Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private
Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584, 589 (1975). In the case of non-
disclosure, plaintiffs would face the particularly heavy burden of having to prove reliance on
the negative of undisclosed facts. Id. at 590.
n' See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964).
2 If a proxy solicitation law suit is brought before a vote is held, the vote can be
enjoined. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 383. Shareholders who are not deceived
by defective proxy statements and thus recognize the defects immediately are in a better
position to sue in time to get an injunction than shareholders who are deceived. Consequently,
courts would be spared the difficult task of fashioning retrospective relief. See Mills v. Elec-
tric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 386-87; Ash v. Baker, 392 F. Supp. 368, 370, 372 (E.D. Pa.
1975). Permitting suits by the plaintiffs most likely to seek timely relief is consistent with
the Supreme Court's approach in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak, the
Court held that a private shareholder derivative action for violation of proxy laws was avail-
able because suits by individual shareholders and the SEC would be inadequate to insure
compliance with the proxy laws. 377 U.S. at 432.
221 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the materiality aspects of the
Parklane decision, see text accompanying notes 114-36 supra.
2' Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 385 n.7.
7- 558 F.2d at 1085. All of the shares held by Parklane's public shareholders were to be
purchased by the company with which Parklane was to merge. Id.
21 Id. The president of Parklane was Parklane's principal shareholder. By bringing about
the merger, and thus the purchase of all of Parklane's stock, he would be able to liquidate
his personal assets so as to pay off his debts. Id. at 1085-86.
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plaintiffs had shown a proxy law violation.23 The court found that minority
shareholders, while lacking the votes to block the merger, were not help-
less. The minority shareholders could have sought an injunction under
New York law had they been apprised of the omitted facts."3 The omission,
therefore, enabled Parklane to consummate the merger234 and thus violated
proxy solicitation law.?5
The court phrased its holding in Parklane in terms of materiality rather
than causation.2 3 Because causation is a necessary element of a proxy law
violation suit27 and the suit succeeded in Parklane, a finding of causation
is implicit in the decision. Parklane, therefore, represents an expansion of
the Mills causation test to instances in which the party soliciting proxies
possesses sufficient votes to insure the approval of a merger without regard
to how the minority proxies are cast. 5 The court's decision reflects the fact
that shareholder votes have importance beyond sheer numbers.29 Stock
exchange rules or corporate by-laws may require the solicitation of proxies
before corporate action is taken even when minority shareholders lack the
votes to block a transaction.24 Corporations may solicit proxies voluntarily
to give shareholders a sense of corporate participation 24 ' thus facilitating
corporate actions by precluding obstructive measures by disgruntled
shareholders.2 12 The proxy solicitation law policy of insuring informed
shareholder votes requires disclosure if solicitation of minority proxies is
to be more than a meaningless ritual for placating ignorant shareholders.
2 3





See text accompanying note 8 supra.
2 Had the court believed that causation could not be shown when minority shareholders
had insufficient votes to block a merger, plaintiffs would have been denied relief regardless
of the materiality of the omission. The Second Circuit's holding that causation can be shown
in such a situation accords with its earlier decisions in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1974), and Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1971).
The court's position is further supported by commentators. E.g., Causation and Liability,
supra note 8, at 111-23.
21 See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1974).
"I See Beek, Disclosure Requirements in Minority Stockholder Freezeouts, 32 Bus. LAw.
1505, 1506 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Minority Stockholder Freezeouts]; Causation and
Libility, supra note 8, at 114-23.
2" Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 114.
242 Id. at 123. Full disclosure may affect shareholder choices unrelated to voting. Disclo-
sure of questionable aspects of a merger may cause majority shareholders to reconsider their
voting decision. Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 117. Full disclosure permits minor-
ity shareholders to decide whether to exercise appraisal rights, Minority Stockholder Freeze-
outs, supra note 240, at 1507; Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 117, wage a public
campaign against the merger, Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 117, seek to enjoin
the merger, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974); Causation
and Liability, supra note 8, at 118-19, or negotiate more favorable merger terms. Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 772 (3d Cir. 1976).
24 Causation and Liability, supra note 8, at 123. If the dissemination of proxy statements
to shareholders with insufficient voting power to block a transaction is for the purpose of
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